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COURT-APPOINTMENT COMPENSATION AND
RURAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
HANNAH HAKSGAARD†
Abstract
Hourly rates paid to court-appointed lawyers impact access to justice. Courtappointed lawyers provide necessary counsel in civil and criminal cases, yet
hourly rates in many jurisdictions are so low that many lawyers cannot afford
to take court-appointed cases. This article argues that low hourly rates cause
problems: namely, appointed lawyers will be insufficient in number,
inaccessible to their clients, and sometimes even ineffective. These problems
are heightened in rural America where they are compounded by
geographical distance and the rural lawyer shortage. This article concludes
by suggesting a number of policy solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Court-appointed lawyers play an important role in access to justice
in criminal and civil cases. Among other services, court-appointed lawyers
serve as guardians ad litem to represent the interest of children; they represent
indigent1 witnesses; they represent parties in guardianship cases,
termination-of-parental-rights cases, and involuntary civil commitments.2 In
the criminal context, court-appointed lawyers represent defendants where
public defenders are unable to take a case. This might be because of a conflict
or because, as occurs frequently in small and rural communities, the locality
has no public defender’s office.3 These appointed attorneys are critical in
ensuring that indigent Americans have access to justice.
Despite the critical role that these attorneys play, court-appointed
lawyers are chronically underpaid. In recent years—as costs increase and
hourly rates stagnate—much has been written on the topic of hourly rates for
court-appointed attorneys. Most of the recent literature on court-appointment
rates focuses on criminal law, but court-appointed lawyers also play a critical
1

Throughout this article, I use the word “indigent” to refer to any client who
qualifies for appointed counsel based on income levels set by the relevant
jurisdiction. I use indigent because that is the most-used descriptor; however,
sources also will use language such as “poor” and “impecunious” to describe
individuals who receive appointed counsel based on inability to afford private
counsel. See, e.g., Bruce Andrew Green, Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in
Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 366, 367 (1981) (using the phrases “impecunious litigants” and “the
poor”).
2
See, e.g., N.H. SUP. CT. R. 48 (providing a list of instances outside of the
criminal context where courts may appoint attorneys).
3
Many rural counties have no public defender and instead rely entirely on
court-appointed attorneys. Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders,
Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel
Matter, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 363 (1991) (observing that “[t]he counties served by
assigned and contract counsel tend to be smaller” than those served by public
defender’s offices); David Paul Cullen, Indigent Defense Comparison of Ad Hoc
and Contract Defense in Five Semi-Rural Jurisdictions, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
311, 322 (1992) (“The public defender system is used primarily in urban areas
since it requires a relatively large population for support.”). See also Lisa R. Pruitt
& Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of
Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (2010) (profiling the different types of
criminal defense systems in Arizona counties). The only state without any public
defender’s offices is Maine, which relies entirely on court-appointed lawyers for
criminal appointments. Andrew Davies & Alyssa Clark, Gideon in the Desert: An
Empirical Study of Providing Counsel to Criminal Defendants in Rural Places, 71
ME. L. REV. 245, 269 (2019).
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role in civil cases.4 This article builds on existing literature and once again
addresses the issue of hourly rates for court-appointed attorneys, this time for
the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy’s “Inequality
of Wealth, Race, and Class, Equality of Opportunity” symposium. In
particular, this article is inspired by the advocacy work of Phil Garland,5 a
rural attorney practicing in Garner, Iowa (population 3,036) who originally
brought this issue to my attention two years ago. This article builds off
Garland’s advocacy by focusing on inequalities in access to justice for rural
clients and the role that low hourly rates for court-appointed lawyers play in
access to justice issues in rural America.
By focusing on rural areas, I do not suggest that more densely
populated places do not face access to justice barriers because of low hourly
rates. In fact, more populated areas likely have different access problems that
this article does not address. Although low hourly rates are a problem
everywhere, I choose to narrowly focus on rural areas. My focus is on rural
areas because rural areas face certain unique disadvantages that should be
studied separately.6 Although the problems created by low hourly rates in
rural areas are widely known by rural practitioners and those connected with
appointment systems,7 almost none of the scholarship written in the last fifty
4

The criminal law focus in access to justice literature is not unique to
appointed rates; it has previously been observed—and remedied—in other areas.
See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1270 (2016) (“Despite a great deal of interest among sociolegal scholars in studying race and class disparities in the criminal justice system,
there has been relatively little work examining similar disparities in the civil justice
system.”).
5
GARLAND & RODRIGUEZ,
http://garlandandrodriguezattorneys.com/home/4545912 (last visited July 13, 2020)
(website of Phil Garland’s law firm).
6
As legal scholarship begins to examine issues germane to rural areas,
scholars are acknowledging that work about rural areas might apply outside of rural
areas, but also that specific issues arise in rural areas that should be addressed
separately. See, e.g., Maybell Romero, Profit-Driven Prosecution and the
Competitive Bidding Process, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 168 (2017)
(“[There are] specific incentives, both personal and institutional, that arise in
smaller, often rural but also suburban and urban, jurisdictions through the
country[.]”); id. at 210 (“Providing for indigent defense services, much like
prosecution services, is also difficult for small governments, especially those
located in nonmetropolitan areas.”).
7
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, Attorney, Philip L. Garland Law
Firm (July 14, 2020) (discussing impacts of low hourly rates in rural areas); Zoom
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years even mentions the particular impact of low hourly rates in rural areas.8
It has been over a half a century since the last article focused on hourly rates
in rural areas. Robert S. Hunter, a former Illinois judge, authored a 1969
article that focused on the particular impact of unpaid or low-paid court
appointments in rural areas and small communities.9 Hunter discussed the
problems with low- or no-pay court appointments generally, while also
acknowledging the special burdens in rural areas.10 Much of his analysis
remains true today. The fact that scholarship on court-appointment rates has
largely ignored rural areas in the last fifty years is particularly concerning
because the rural lawyer shortage is becoming more pronounced.11 Research
on providing counsel to indigent criminal defendants has looked specifically
at rural areas,12 and state-specific studies on hourly rates have taken rurality
and the rural lawyer shortage into account. But this article is the first in fifty
years to take a direct look at the specific problems that court-appointment
compensation schemes create in rural areas. Throughout this article I discuss
Interview with Kathy Pakes, Assigned Couns. Div. Dir. at Wis. State Pub. Defs.
(July 25, 2020) (same); Zoom Interview with Adam Plotkin, Legis. Liaison at Wis.
State Pub. Defs. (July 25, 2020) (same).
8
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 4. In 1992, David Paul Cullen wrote about
contracted defense work in five semi-rural counties in Oklahoma (the smallest of
which had a population of 15,000), but despite the word “rural” appearing in the
title of the article, he did not analyze rurality in his study. Cullen, supra note 3, at
339-75.
9
Robert S. Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts—A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE
& COMMENT 3, 8 (1969). One other article that analyzed court appointments with
discussion of the special impact on rural areas was Henry M. Hills, Note, Current
Status of the Traditional Duty of the Attorney to Serve Without Compensation Upon
Court Appointment, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 1001 (1991). Hills cited to and quoted Hunter
for the proposition that the biggest burden of court appointments fell on lawyers in
small communities. Id. at 1013 (citing Hunter, supra, at 7-8). Finally, another student
article included an overview of the rural argument from Hunter and Hills in a single
footnote. Kim Schimenti, Comment, Pro Choice for Lawyers in A Revised Pro Bono
System, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 641, 683 n. 197 (1993).
10
Hunter, supra note 9, at 9.
11
See generally Lisa R. Pruitt et. al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective
on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 15, 121 (2018) (“lawyers [in
rural areas] are aging and retiring, and too few new lawyers are stepping forward to
take their place.”).
12
See, e.g., Davies & Clark, supra note 3 (analyzing the provision of criminal
defense lawyers for indigent defendants in Texas with a particular attention on rural
counties); Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3 (analyzing the provision of criminal
defense lawyers for indigent defendants in Arizona with a particular attention on
rural counties).
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problems that exist in all communities, while also pointing out how those
issues might operate differently—or similarly—in rural areas.
The focus on rural areas is not meant to hide how any number of
other characteristics—including race, gender, age, and immigration status—
impact access to justice. Existing literature and this article acknowledge that
those characteristics can impact access to justice.13 While acknowledging
how access to justice barriers are frequently intersectional in nature, this
article focuses on the additional consideration of rurality. Rural areas are
racially and ethnically diverse,14 and include substantial immigrant
populations.15 Those facts are not forgotten in this article or in the solutions
I propose.
This article begins by providing a brief overview of current
reimbursement rates and systems. Part I provides an overview of current
systems and—in an effort to demonstrate the difficulty of changing hourly
rates—profiles recent changes in court-appointment compensation in Iowa,
where rates increased on July 1, 2019, and in Wisconsin, where rates
increased on January 1, 2020. Part II observes that low hourly rates create a
system where there are insufficient numbers of lawyers willing to take court
appointments, those lawyers are more likely to be geographically
inaccessible, and those lawyers may even be ineffective because of the low
hourly rates. Specifically, Part II uses an inequality lens to focus on how
legal access in rural areas is uniquely disadvantaged when hourly rates are
too low. Finally, Part III discusses potential solutions, again with a focus on
the unique circumstances of rural areas.

13

See, e.g., Greene, supra note 4 (analyzing how race and class impacts civil
access to justice); Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 118–19 (noting the impact of race
and poverty on rural access to justice).
14
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 118 (“Perhaps contrary to popular perception,
many rural areas of the states we surveyed are racially and ethnically diverse.”);
See also Daniel T. Lichter, Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural
America, 77 RURAL SOCIO. 3, 4 (2012) (“The demographic reality, of course, is
that rural America has been home throughout its history to large numbers of racial
and ethnic minorities. America’s rural racial minorities, however, are often
geographically and socially isolated from mainstream America and easily forgotten
or ignored.”).
15
See generally Lichter, supra note 14 (discussing immigration to rural
communities).
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CURRENT HOURLY RATES

This section provides a brief overview of how the court-appointment
system works and provides some examples of state schemes. Every
jurisdiction has different situations where it uses court-appointed lawyers,
has different compensation schemes, and has different recoupment schemes.
Most important to this article are the compensation schemes. There are three
different ways states set the compensation for court-appointed lawyers: (1)
at a specific rate set in code or regulation, (2) at the discretion of a court, or
(3) through contracts with individual lawyers or firms. Several recent reports
commissioned by professional associations—including from 2002,16 2007,17
2013,18 and 201819—have collected the details of how each state compensates
court-appointed lawyers and at what rate. State-specific reports have also
addressed the issue.20 Examining these various reports from the last twenty
years shows that states are constantly shifting how and how much they pay
court-appointed lawyers. Although these compensation schemes are
constantly in flux, they have not normalized. There are both major and minor
differences between jurisdictions.
The clearest payment structures for court-appointed attorneys are
found in states that set hourly rates by statute or court rule. Yet even the states
16

The Spangenberg Grp., Rates of Compensation Paid to Court-Appointed
Counsel in Non-Capital Felony Cases at Trial: A State-by-State Overview, A.B A.
BAR INFO. PROGRAM (Oct. 2002), http://www.sado.org/fees/2002noncapitalNarrative.pdf.
17
The Spangenberg Grp., Rates of Compensation Paid to Court-Appointed
Counsel in Non-Capital Felony Cases at Trial: A State-by-State Overview, THE
A.B.A. BAR INFO. PROGRAM (Oct. 2007),
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lc/study/2010/special_committee_on_crimina
l_justice_funding_and_strategies/100_october_22_2010_subcommittee_on_fundin
g_components/oct22spangenberg.
18
John P. Gross, Gideon at 50: A Three-Part Examination of Indigent Defense
in America, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS. 1–18 (Mar. 2013),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/cf613fe0-8f46-4dc1-b74782346328522e/gideon-at-50-rationing-justice-the-underfunding-of-assignedcounsel-systems-part-1-.pdf.
19
Sixth Amend. Ctr., Pub. No. 2018.003, Justice Shortchanged Part II:
Assigned Counsel Compensation in Wisconsin, WIS. ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS.
30–35 (Apr. 2018), https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/1706petresp.pdf.
20
See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., Report to the Nebraska Supreme
Court on Indigent Defense Systems and Fee Structures, UNIV. OF NEB. PUB. POL’Y
CTR. (2006). https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications/33
(discussing Nebraska).
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with clearly set rates vary substantially in a number of ways. What follows
is a survey of rates set by statutes or rules in ten states.21 To begin, the rates
themselves vary significantly. Alabama compensates court-appointed
lawyers at $70 an hour and has different code sections specifying this as the
rate for trial work, appellate work, and post-conviction proceedings.22
Colorado compensates court-appointed lawyers at “a rate not exceeding $60
per hour.”23 Hawaii compensates court-appointed lawyers at the rate of $90
an hour.24
Some state schemes provide different kinds of compensation for
different types of cases or different types of work. Alaska—for both criminal
cases and guardians ad litem—compensates court-appointed lawyers at the
rate of $60 an hour for in-court representation and $50 an hour for out-ofcourt work.25 Iowa compensates court-appointed lawyers at the rate of $73
an hour for Class A felonies, $68 an hour for Class B felonies, and $63 an
hour for all other cases.26 New Hampshire compensates court-appointed
lawyers at the rate of $100 an hour for major crime cases and $60 an hour for
all other cases.27 Massachusetts breaks out its compensation amounts into
several different categories based on type of case, providing: $100 an hour
for homicide cases, $68 an hour for other criminal cases occurring in its
superior court, $55 an hour for children and family cases, and $53 an hour
for sex offender registry cases, mental health cases, cases about children in
need of services, and cases that occur in its district courts.28
Some states’ schemes complicate this by having a combination of
established rates and discretionary rates. Kansas compensates courtappointed lawyers at the rate of $80 an hour, but allows exceptions to that
rate.29 New York statutes set the compensation rate for trial level work,
21

These states were randomly selected by my law student research assistant.
ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (2013) (covering trial work); ALA. CODE § 15-1222(c)(1) (2013) (covering appellate work); ALA. CODE § 15-12-23(d) (1975)
(covering post-conviction proceedings).
23
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. P. 44(e)(2).
24
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-5(b) (West 2015).
25
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 60.010 (1986) (covering criminal cases);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 60.030(1) (1986) (covering guardians ad litem).
26
IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.7(4) (West 2019).
27
N.H. SUP. CT. R. 47(2)(a) (covering criminal defendants); N.H. SUP. CT. R.
48-A(2)(a) (covering guardian ad litem fees); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 48(2)(a) (covering
all other cases).
28
MASS. GEN. LAWSANN.ch. 211D, § 11(a) (West 2018).
29
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4507(c) (West 2007).
22
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compensating appointed attorneys at the rate of $75 an hour for felonies and
covered family law cases and $60 an hour for misdemeanor or lesser
offenses.30 However, the New York statutes allow appellate courts to set
compensation and reimbursement rates.31 South Carolina compensates courtappointed lawyers at a rate of $60 an hour for in-court time and $40 an hour
for out-of-court time,32 but in murder cases court-appointed lawyers are paid
based on what a court deems appropriate.33
These ten states provide just a sample of jurisdictions that set their
rates by statute or administrative rule. In ten jurisdictions, including Alaska
and Colorado as profiled above, the state supreme court sets the rate of
compensation for some or all appointments.34 Some states allow local
governments to hire appointed counsel by contract. In other states, local
judges get to appoint counsel and decide reasonable fees. Arizona provides
an example of this: “[i]f counsel is appointed by the court and represents the
defendant in either a criminal proceeding or insanity hearing . . .
[c]ompensation for services rendered to the defendant shall be in an amount
that the court in its discretion deems reasonable, considering the services
performed.”35 Additionally, some states use a mixture of different payment
schemes in different counties.36
Complicating the payment schemes even more, in many states
appointments for criminal cases and appointments for civil cases are
governed by different rules. A final wrinkle is that sometimes the rate paid
depends on how the lawyer is appointed. For example, in Wisconsin,
appointed criminal defense attorneys—doing the exact same work—can be

30

N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2004).
Id. § 722-b(3).
32
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50(A) (West 2007).
33
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-20 (West 1976).
34
David Carroll & Phyllis Mann, Wisconsin Supreme Court increases
compensation to some, but not all, indigent defense attorneys, SIXTH AMEND. CTR.
(July 11, 2018), https://sixthamendment.org/wisconsin-supreme-court-increasescompensation-to-some-but-not-all-indigent-defense-attorneys/ (reporting state
supreme courts setting rates in ten states as of 2018: Alaska, Colorado, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
35
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013 (West 2005).
36
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 23 (outlining courtappointment payment schemes for appointed defense counsel in Nebraska); See
also Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 315 (chart outlining different payment
schemes in some Arizona counties).
31
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appointed by the state public defender at a rate of $70 an hour37 or by a court
at a rate of $100 an hour.38
In addition to setting hourly rates, many states also impose limits on
the total amount of fees a court-appointed attorney can collect,39 thus
encouraging attorneys to limit their hours of work to stay at or under the
maximum compensation amount. Much like hourly rates can be different
based on the type of work, the maximum total fees also changes based on the
type of case in some jurisdictions.40 At least one state—Massachusetts—sets
the limit based on the number of billable hours per case, not based on total
collected fees.41 In Philadelphia, flat rates are paid to criminal defense
attorneys on murder cases regardless of how many hours are worked.42 These
limitations serve as a cap on the number of hours a court-appointed lawyer
should spend on a particular case. If a lawyer exceeds the cap, the excess
hours worked go unpaid.
Differences also exist in how states change hourly rates. Periodic
increases are necessary to maintain a competitive rate, yet most states have
no easy mechanism for increasing their set hourly rates.43 Massachusetts
requires periodic review of the hourly rates by a committee not less than once
every three years.44 To the envy of many, South Dakota’s court-appointed
hourly rate increases automatically with any cost of living increase received

37
38

WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 977.08(4m)(d) (West 2019).
In re the Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, at 13–14 (Wis. June 27,

2018),
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=2
15099.
39
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1975) (providing specific limits for all
cases except for death penalty cases).
40
See, e.g., N.H. SUP. CT. R. 48(2)(b)-(k) (providing specific limits for various
categories of cases).
41
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211D, § 11(b) (West 2018).
42
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J.
154, 162–63 (2012).
43
See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 23 (“As one judge
remarked, ‘The base rate should be increased by 5-10% every 3-5 years. If we
don’t pay a competitive rate, we loose [sic] our most qualified practitioners.’”).
44
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211D, § 11(a) (West 2018). For additional
information on how Massachusetts came to this policy, see In re the Petition to
Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 10, and Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 1031, 1051–54 (2006) (noting the situation in Massachusetts in the 2000s).
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by state employees.45 Since this policy was adopted in 2000, South Dakota’s
hourly rate increased from $67 in 200046 to $97 in 2020.47
States that set their hourly rates by statute tend to face large political
battles every time rates need to be raised because raising rates requires
legislative buy-in. Recent increases in hourly rates in Wisconsin and Iowa
demonstrate how intractable legislatures are with increasing fees. Until 2020,
the hourly rate in Wisconsin for criminal defense counsel appointed by the
state public defender’s office was set at a maximum of only $40 an hour.48
That rate had been in place since 1995, when the state legislature actually
decreased the maximum rate from $50 an hour to $40 an hour.49 It took years
of legal advocacy and maneuvering to ultimately see the 2020 increase to $70
an hour. Between 1995 and 2018, the public defender’s office in Wisconsin
asked the legislature for an increase in the rates during every biennial
budget.50 Before the increase to $70 was approved by the legislature, the
advocacy work in Wisconsin included asking the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin to overrule the legislatively set rate, which the court declined to
do.51
In Iowa, a similarly long process occurred. Phil Garland, a rural Iowa
attorney, has played a key role in multiple advocacy efforts to raise rates in
Iowa—his efforts contributed to an increase in 2007 and an increase in

45

Court Appointed Attorney Guidelines, S.D. UNIFIED JUD. SYS. 7 (Jan. 21,
2020), https://ujs.sd.gov/uploads/docs/CourtAppointedAttorneyGuidelines.pdf
(“Subsequently, court-appointed attorney fees will increase annually in an amount
equal to the cost of living increase that state employees receive each year from the
legislature.”).
46
Gross, supra note 18, at 13 (“[B]eginning in the year 2000, flat fees were
abolished and an hourly rate of $67 was established along with an order that each
year the fees would increase in an amount equal to the cost of living increase that
state employees received that year.”).
47
Court Appointed Attorney Guidelines, supra note 45, at 2 (“The rate
effective as of January 1, 2020, is $97.00 per hour.”).
48
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08(4m)(c) (West 2019) (noting that appointments
between 1995 and 2020 should be paid no more than $40 an hour).
49
Id. § 977.08(4m)(d) (noting that appointments between 1992 and 1995
should be paid no more than $50 an hour).
50
Zoom Interview with Adam Plotkin, supra note 7; See In re the Petition to
Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 9; See also id. (“Since 1999, 18
separate formal efforts to obtain a rate increase have been tried and failed.”).
51
In re the Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 2
(pointing out the real purpose of the petition was to leverage a Supreme Court order
to force the legislature to act).
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2019.52 The 2019 increase is modest—Iowa’s hourly rate for court-appointed
attorneys increased by only $3.53 For appointments made from July 1, 2007,
to June 30, 2019, Iowa compensated attorneys at the rate of $70 an hour for
class A felonies, $65 an hour for class B felonies, and $60 for all other
cases.54 Starting on July 1, 2019, that rate increased by $3 an hour for each
category to $73 an hour for class A felonies, $68 an hour for class B felonies,
and $63 an hour for all other cases.55 The Iowa State Bar Association
continues to lobby for additional and immediate increases to these rates.56
Although the original goal was to increase the rates $3 in 2019, $3 in 2020,
and $4 in 2021—for a total of a $10 an hour increase—the 2020 increase did
not happen, and, because of COVID-19, it is unlikely that the 2021 increase
will occur.57 Iowa, then, has not seen a significant increase in hourly rates
since 2007 and is unlikely to see one soon.
Although this article focuses on the hourly rates paid to appointed
attorneys, it is worth mentioning two related issues that impact courtappointed counsel. The first is court appointments that come without any
compensation. The second is recoupment statutes, by which the government
attempts to collect attorney’s fees from indigent clients.
In the first situation—where a lawyer is appointed with no
compensation—a court might appoint a lawyer without any intent and/or
ability to later award attorney’s fees to that lawyer.58 Lawyers who agree to
take these court appointments are taking pro bono appointments. Most of the
52

Willard L. “Bill” Boyd III, Rural Practice: Challenges, Rewards and
Solutions, 79 THE IOWA LAW. 5, 5 (Nov. 2019),
https://www.drake.edu/media/collegesschools/law/docs/November_Iowa_Lawyer_
2019_Updated.pdf (“[Phil Garland has been involved in] seeking legislative
approval for additional increases in the hourly rate for court-appointed lawyers[.]”).
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
53
IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.7(5) (West 2019) (establishing rate for cases
appointed on or after July 1, 2019).
54
Id. § 815.7(4).
55
Id. § 815.7(5).
56
Indigent Defense, IOWA STATE BAR ASS’N, at 1 ,
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iowabar.org/resource/resmgr/legislative_items/2020_
INDIGENT_DEFENSE_INFORM.pdf (last updated Dec. 23, 2019).
57
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
58
See, e.g., Scott M. Strauss & Alexander W. Chak, Requiring the
Uncompensated Lawyer to Represent Civil Litigants Is Unconstitutional: The
Emperor Has No Clothes, 53 ARK. LAW. 20, 20 (2018) (criticizing appointments
with no compensation in the federal courts); See also Green, supra note 1, at 369
(“Some courts, however, have continued to appoint attorneys without
compensation in both criminal and civil cases.”).
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time, lawyers voluntarily accept uncompensated court appointments, but this
is not always the case. Courts are currently split on whether it is constitutional
to require lawyers to take cases without compensation,59 but we know that
forced pro bono appointments do occur on occasion.60 Sometimes,
uncompensated appointments, while not forced, are unexpected. This might
happen when a lawyer takes an appointment expecting payment, but a judge
never orders that the lawyer be paid.61
For example, in the 2010 South Dakota Supreme Court case of In re
Guardianship of S.M.N.,62 a trial court had appointed counsel for the natural
mother of three children when a family member sought guardianship of those
three children.63 The trial court made this appointment under a state statute
that allows a court to appoint “an attorney, guardian ad litem, or court
representative if the court determines that such an appointment is
59

Compare State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985)
(“While we encourage members of the bar to explore all possible avenues for
assuring equal access to justice, we do not believe that courts have the inherent
power in civil cases to provide the alternative of compelling representation without
compensation.”), with In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 438, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55 (N.Y.
1975) (“Inherent in the courts and historically associated with the duty of the Bar to
provide uncompensated services for the indigent has been the discretionary power
of the courts to assign counsel in a proper case to represent private indigent
litigants. Such counsel serves without compensation.”). See also Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak, No Power to Require Attorneys to Take § 1983
Actions, 4 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 19.36(e) (May 2020) (“Some courts have
reached the issue and declared unconstitutional statutes requiring attorneys to serve
as counsel, without compensation, in civil cases. Other courts, in appointed
criminal cases, have declared that there was an uncompensated taking of property
(the lawyer's services) unless the lawyer is paid adequately.”), and Christopher D.
Atwell, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Court Appointment: Increasing
Recognition of an Unfair Burden, 44 SW. L.J. 1229 (1990).
60
See Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 804 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We hold that,
where a district court has determined that exceptional circumstances warrant
appointment of counsel and has unsuccessfully attempted to secure a noncompulsory appointment, the court may invoke its inherent power to order an
attorney to represent an indigent civil rights litigant pro bono.”); See also Sarah B.
Schnorrenberg, Note, Mandating Justice: Naranjo v. Thompson As A Solution for
Unequal Access to Representation, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 260, 262 (2019)
(discussing uncompensated court appointments).
61
See, e.g., E-mail from Ashley Anson, Att’y, Ashley Anson, Prof. LLC to
author, Assoc. Professor of L., Univ. of S.D. Sch. of L. (May 5, 2020, 10:48 AM)
(on file with author) (detailing an appointment that the attorney expected the
county would pay, but then did not pay to her).
62
2010 S.D. 31, 781 N.W.2d 213.
63
Id. at ¶ 8; 781 N.W.2d at 227.
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necessary.”64 Although the state statute authorized appointment of the
attorney to represent the natural mother, no statute specified that the county
would pay the attorney.65 The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the
county could not be required to pay attorney’s fees.66 In situations like this,
a court-appointed lawyer may be able to seek fees directly from the indigent
client, but will face a difficult journey in collecting attorney’s fees from a
client who was appointed counsel precisely because the client could not
afford to hire counsel.
The second issue related to hourly rates is that some states also have
recoupment statutes. Recoupment statutes require represented individuals to
reimburse the government for the cost of the legal services provided.67 These
statutes can cover the costs of appointed counsel, as well as the public
defender.68 In 1974, the Supreme Court held recoupment statutes
constitutional for criminal defendants,69 and recoupment is now a widespread
practice.70 In jurisdictions that attempt to recoup attorneys’ fees from clients
who receive appointed counsel, increasing hourly rates for attorneys
naturally leads to increased fees and financial obligations faced by those
indigent clients.
Although fully uncompensated service and recoupment statutes
inform this topic, the rest of this article focuses on the hourly rates paid to
appointed counsel. Much of this article focuses on state compensation
schemes, but the federal government also uses appointed counsel. As of
64

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-117 (1995).
In re Guardianship of S.M.N., 2010 S.D. 31 at ¶ 38, 781 N.W.2d at 226–27.
66
Id. at ¶ 38, 781 N.W.2d at 227 (“[T]he Legislature has not provided any
statutory authority imposing the duty to pay the natural parent's attorney's fees in a
guardianship proceeding on the county.”).
67
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay
for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 324 (2009) (“Throughout the country, debts for defense
fees and costs are imposed on defendants either as recoupment (court-ordered
reimbursement over time) or as contribution (a co-pay or application fee imposed at
the time of appointment) or both. Recoupment might be a flat fee of several
hundred dollars or the attorney's hourly fee for representation.”).
68
Id. (discussing recoupment statutes as applied to public defenders and
appointed counsel).
69
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). Fuller was decided only two years
after the Supreme Court found the Kansas recoupment statutes unconstitutional in
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), for violating the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
70
Anderson, supra note 67, at 329–32.
65
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2020, the federal courts compensate appointed attorneys at the rate of $152
an hour for non-capital criminal appointments.71 This rate is substantially
higher than the rate paid by many states. The federal government prosecutes
a low percentage of criminal cases in the United States overall, but a
substantially higher percentage in some areas, including crimes committed
on the largely rural Indian Reservations governed by the Major Crimes Act.72
Although this higher federal hourly wage might mitigate some of the issues
raised in the next section, serious access to justice issues continue to exist on
rural reservations.73

II.

INSUFFICIENT, INACCESSIBLE, AND INEFFECTIVE LAWYERS

Society—through legislation and constitutional litigation—has
decided that justice requires some individuals be provided appointed counsel.
There is a constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases.74 Although not
constitutionally guaranteed, states have sometimes statutorily decided to
provide counsel in other contexts, such as termination of parental rights cases
or involuntary commitment hearings. But promising access to counsel
through the constitution or statutes is only one step to achieving equal access
to justice.75 For the promise of counsel to be fulfilled, there must be enough
71

Guide to Judiciary Pol’y, 7 U.S. CTS. pt. A, ch. 2, § 230.16 (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-2ss-230-compensation-and-expenses#a230_16./.
72
18 U.S.C. § 1153. The Major Crimes Act provides that federal courts will
have criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in “Indian country” by Native
Americans. Id. The Major Crimes Act applies to most reservations, but not all.
With Public Law 280, Congress gave criminal and civil jurisdiction to state courts
in six states: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (civil jurisdiction). See also
Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over
Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 917 (2012)
(“In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 (P.L. 280), which required six states to
assert jurisdiction over Indian country[.]”).
73
See Richard Braunstein & Steve Feimer, South Dakota Criminal Justice: A
Study of Racial Disparities, 48 S.D. L. REV. 171, 179 (2003) (discussing Native
Americans in South Dakota), and Richard Braunstein & Amy Schweinle,
Explaining Race Disparities in South Dakota Sentencing and Incarceration, 50
S.D. L. REV. 440 (2005) (same).
74
See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75
And of course, access to justice means more than just being provided
counsel, but counsel is a start. See Maybell Romero, Viewing Access to Justice for
Rural Mainers of Color Through A Prosecution Lens, 71 ME. L. REV. 227, 234
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lawyers who can take those appointments, those lawyers need to be
accessible to their clients, and those lawyers need to be effective. This section
lays out the problems with low hourly rates and argues that if rates are too
low, there will be insufficient lawyers, inaccessible lawyers, and even
ineffective lawyers.
Geography and the rural lawyer shortage compound the problems
created by low hourly rates for court-appointed lawyers in rural areas.
Accordingly, this section also discusses how these problems—that appointed
lawyers may be insufficient, inaccessible, and ineffective—are heightened in
rural areas.

A. Number of Lawyers
When hourly rates for court-appointed attorneys are too low—
particularly in comparison to other work available—courts are unable to find
lawyers to take cases.76 There may be delays in finding lawyers willing to
take cases77 and fewer attorneys will be willing to take the cases at all.78 Some
(2019) (“Access to justice, however, incorporates much more than access to
counsel and should be thought of as addressing a number of conditions.”).
76
In re the Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 3
(“Most attorneys will not accept [state public defender] appointments because they
literally lose money if they take these cases. Consequently, the [state public
defender] struggles to find counsel who will represent indigent criminal
defendants.”).
77
Thomas John Walsh, Frozen in Time: Criminal Justice System & Public
Defender Pay, 91 WIS. LAW. (June 1, 2018),
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?V
olume=91&Issue=6&ArticleID=26398 (“[T]he court may wait significantly longer
to process the case while waiting to find private counsel willing to take the case at
the lower rate.”).
78
Steven D. Benjamin, Foreword to Gideon At 50: A Three-Part Examination
of Indigent Defense in America, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS 1, 6 (March
2013), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/cf613fe0-8f46-4dc1-b74782346328522e/gideon-at-50-rationing-justice-the-underfunding-of-assignedcounsel-systems-part-1-.pdf (“Inadequate compensation substantially reduces the
number of attorneys willing to represent indigent defendants[.]”); See also Gross,
supra note 18, at 8 (“Inadequate compensation for assigned counsel discourages the
participation of the private bar[.]”); Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio pours cash into paying
lawyers to represent indigent clients, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, (January 21, 2020),
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/ohio-pours-cash-into-payinglawyers-represent-indigent-clients/UuE0Uqsi8iLVRBpfF9ARFJ/ (“Multiple
studies have found that when appointed counsel rates are too low, qualiﬁed
attorneys stop taking appointed cases.”).
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lawyers may choose to accept some court appointments, but limit the number
because they are losing money.79 All of these problems are more serious in
rural areas that face a general lawyer shortage.80 In rural areas there may not
be enough lawyers to cover the legal needs of the community.81 The shortage
of attorneys in general practice also means a shortage of attorneys available
for court appointments.82 Existing state-specific research indicates that rural
areas are most impacted by low hourly rates. A survey of judges in Nebraska
found that “[j]udges in some rural areas of the state felt that there were not
enough qualified attorneys in their jurisdiction to appoint.”83 In Kansas, rural
counties pose the most difficult problem for finding qualified lawyers to take
cases.84 In Wisconsin, “[t]he impact [of low hourly rates] is sharply
accentuated in rural areas” where sometimes calls have to go out to dozens
or even hundreds of lawyers to find one willing to take the case. Even then,
the lawyer taking the case “might be one whose office is several counties
away.”85 The negative impacts of low hourly rates affect both urban and rural
areas, but some of the impacts are exacerbated by the nature of practicing in
rural areas and the existing rural lawyer shortages.
79

See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 23 (“As one district
court judge [from Nebraska] explains, ‘[y]ou cannot expect private assigned
counsel to accept frequent appointments unless compensation is close to their
hourly rate of retained counsel.’”).
80
See generally Pruitt et al., supra note 11 (providing evidence of the rural
lawyer shortage).
81
See generally id. (documenting the rural lawyer shortage). A shortage of
lawyers in rural areas has wide-ranging consequences, including public health
consequences. Michele Statz & Paula Termuhlen, Rural Legal Deserts Are a
Critical Health Determinant, 110 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1519 (2020).
82
See Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 106–08 (providing a vignette about
Gregory County, South Dakota, to demonstrate that even if there are rural attorneys
in a community, very few may be able to take court appointments).
83
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 13.
84
Peter Hancock, Attorneys seek pay raise for indigent defense work; situation
could reach ‘crisis’ level in Douglas County, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Sept. 28,
2015, 04:52 PM), https://www2.ljworld.com/news/2015/sep/28/attorneys-seek-payraise-indigents-defense-work/.
85
Bruce Vielmetti, A long-haul defense lawyer makes do with Wisconsin’s
lowest-in-nation pay, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 11, 2018, 03:17 PM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/wisconsin/2018/05/11/wisconsinslowest-nation-pay-defense-lawyers-crisis/579026002/; See also In re the Petition to
Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 6 (“The testimony from our public
hearing indicates that the decrease in lawyers available to accept SPD appointments
disproportionately affects rural counties and has reached a state of crisis in
Northern Wisconsin.”).
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If states expect lawyers to take court appointments, the hourly rates
paid must at a minimum be high enough to cover the overhead of running a
law office.86 The hourly rate for a court-appointed lawyer must be high
enough to cover the maintenance of an office, including rent, the costs of
support staff, professional fees, the cost of liability insurance, the cost of
continuing legal education, and the educational costs of law school—
including student loan payments.87
Simply put, overhead costs often prevent lawyers from doing courtappointed work full-time.88 Lawyers may have higher hourly overhead costs
than the state rate of reimbursement.89 This issue is well known.90 Those who
write about hourly rates consistently point out that low court-appointment
rates will not cover overhead costs.91 Some attorneys will opt out of the
system when the hourly rates cannot cover overhead.92 Most lawyers
86

Walsh, supra note 77 (“[T]he lawyer also must pay his or her overhead and
have enough money left over to put food on the table.”). Estimating overhead costs
per average attorney is difficult, although overhead costs may take over 50% of
lawyer earnings on average. Gross, supra note 18, at 8. Estimates for overhead
costs in Wisconsin found the lowest average overhead per lawyer was $27,000 for
solo practitioners, and the estimates of average overhead per lawyer only rose from
there, with one estimate as high as $113,500 per lawyer. Walsh, supra note 77.
87
See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 22 (“Attorneys are
not compensated adequately. The current fee is not commensurate with the costs of
maintaining an office and the training, education, duties or liability potential
associated with the practice of law.”); See also Hunter, supra note 9, at 8
(“Experience indicates that about one-half of a lawyer’s gross income goes to the
payment of overhead.”).
88
Walsh, supra note 77; See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20,
at 21 (“[A]ttorneys believe that rates should be raised to ensure that attorneys’
overhead expenses are covered. . . . ‘The cost of practicing law is very expensive
and something that those on the public side don’t often realize.’”).
89
See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 84 (discussing Kansas rates and overhead
costs).
90
Not only is this issue well known, it is not new. The topic was discussed in
1983 Congressional hearings about the hourly rate for federal defense counsel.
Cullen, supra note 3, at 326.
91
Bischoff, supra note 78; See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20,
at 22 (“The sentiment held by [some Nebraska] judges is that the hourly rate is too
low, and is not sufficient to cover the overhead of counsel.”).
92
Hancock, supra note 84 (discussing that Lawrence, Kansas attorney John
Frydman stopped taking court appointments because of low rates and rising
overhead costs); Anderson & Heaton, supra note 42, at 194 (finding that in
Philadelphia murder cases and “[a]s a result of the below-market rate for appointed
attorneys, many respected criminal defense attorneys refuse to be on the list to

2020]

Court-Appointment Compensation

105

engaging in court-appointed work must rely on “full-pay clients” to
“subsidize the cost” of doing court appointments,93 and those full-pay clients
may garner more focused legal representation than the clients bringing in
lower court-appointment rates.94 This subsidization can also happen between
attorneys in the same firm. For instance, in rural Iowa, the law firm of
Garland & Rodriguez has one younger attorney who does a substantial
amount of court-appointed work on juvenile cases.95 Phil Garland, the senior
attorney at the firm, calculates that having Carrie Rodriguez, the associate
attorney, handle juvenile court appointments costs the firm approximately
$35 an hour in the associate’s overall cost.96 Phil Garland is willing to spend
additional time working in order to cover this cost, but not all firms are
willing to do this.97
When hourly rates are insufficient to cover the average overhead
rates of lawyers, there are two populations of lawyers who are potentially
best positioned to take a high number of court-appointed cases. First are
lawyers in a firm that are subsidized by other firm lawyers.98 For example,
Phil Garland subsidizing court-appointed work that his associate does in rural
Iowa.99 Larger firms, with even more attorneys and more ability to spread
around any losses, are even more able to take the financial hit. Second are
solo practitioners who are able to keep their overhead costs incredibly low.100
accept indigent defense assignments.”). Another example comes from a 2019
symposium about Maine’s rural lawyer shortage where multiple lawyers noted
throughout the event that firms had decided to stop taking court appointments
precisely because the hourly rate did not cover overhead costs. Hannah Haksgaard,
Rural Practice As Public Interest Work, 71 ME. L. REV. 209, 217 n. 53 (2019)
(citing three speakers who articulated this point).
93
Walsh, supra note 77; See also Gross, supra note 18, at 18 (“An unforeseen
consequence of under-resourcing assigned counsel may be an increase in the cost
of legal services for those defendants who are not classified as indigent.”).
94
Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 269 (“[Criminal defense appointment]
systems [that rely on practicing lawyers] are frequently criticized on structural
grounds: private attorneys accepting ad hoc assignments may be distracted by their
commitments to paying clients[.]”).
95
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
96
Id. Phil Garland explained that the shortage of $35 an hour combines the
amount needed to cover the associate’s salary and her portion of the overhead
costs.
97
Haksgaard, supra note 92, at 217 (noting that entire firms stop taking court
appointment cases).
98
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
99
Id.
100
Walsh, supra note 77.
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For example, Matthew Kirkpatrick, an attorney in rural Wisconsin who
spends the majority of his time taking court appointments,101 “keeps his
expenses low” by having only a home office with no staff.102 Kirkpatrick
does all of his own administrative work and relies on his wife’s employment
benefits—including health insurance.103 Only by keeping his expenses this
low is Kirkpatrick able to dedicate so much of his practice to court
appointments in rural Wisconsin—a state that paid only $40 an hour until a
few months ago.104
One burden that will be higher for many urban attorneys is the cost
of rental space for an office. Even though rental costs may be lower in rural
areas generally, office space can be difficult to find in rural areas. There are
also increased costs, such as the need for more and better vehicles to travel
to court. In addition, most other overhead costs do not decrease simply by
living in a rural area—student loan payments stay the same regardless of
one’s location. Even if rural lawyers can maintain lower overhead costs on
average, rural areas face the highest need for court-appointed lawyers. Not
only does the rural lawyer shortage mean there simply may not be enough
lawyers to fill the legal needs of a community,105 but rural areas tend to rely
disproportionately on court-appointed attorneys because there are likely no
full-time public defenders or legal aid attorneys.106 Therefore, any problems
caused when fees are too low are particularly damaging in rural areas because
of the relatively high proportion of the indigent caseload handled by courtappointed attorneys.
One reason that the disadvantages of low hourly rates
disproportionally impact rural areas is because there are likely no full-time,

101

Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, Att’y, Kirkpatrick Law
Office (June 20, 2020).
102
Vielmetti, supra note 85.
103
Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101.
104
Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08(4m)(c) (establishing that appointments
between 1995 and 2020 should be paid no more than $40 an hour).
105
See generally Pruitt et al., supra note 11 (discussing access to justice issues
in six states that have a rural lawyer shortage).
106
See generally Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 278 (discussing how limited
resources in rural Arizona counties impact the provision of criminal defense
services to indigent clients); Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched
Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 496 (2014) (“Rural
populations are disproportionately poor and . . . lawyers (legal aid attorneys or
otherwise) are scarce in rural areas[.]”).
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salaried public defenders to take criminal cases.107 Because a low population
and low tax base limits spending, many rural counties do not have a public
defender’s office or even a full-time prosecutor.108 The tax base limitations
can be even starker in counties containing federally-recognized Indian Land
because these lands are not taxed by the county.109 In rural and small
communities without a full-time prosecutor, a part-time prosecutor is
frequently appointed by the local government after a competitive bidding
process.110 A similar bidding process can occur for criminal defense
attorneys.111
For criminal defense work in rural areas, many counties rely entirely
on court-appointed lawyers instead of a full-time public defender.112
Nebraska, for example, has a statute requiring public defender’s offices only
in counties with populations of 100,000 or more.113 Less-populated counties
in Nebraska are allowed to have public defender’s offices, but they are also
allowed to forgo public defender’s offices and use contracts or court
appointments for their criminal defense work.114 Therefore, while larger or
wealthier counties have at least one full-time defense attorney to carry the
brunt of criminal defense work, in many rural counties every state-provided
criminal defense attorney is appointed. Rural counties struggle “to achieve

107
Hunter, supra note 9, at 4 (explaining that this is a longstanding problem
because the burden of court appointments on rural attorneys is higher because
“[t]here may be no public defender in rural areas.”).
108
Romero, supra note 6, at 165 (bidding process); id. at 181–82 (use of parttime prosecutors in rural and small communities).
109
Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 254 (“American Indian lands are not taxed
by the state or county, which diminishes the tax bases of counties whose territory
overlaps with tribal lands.”).
110
Romero, supra note 6, at 166 (noting part-time prosecutors are appointed
“often by a mayor or a city council[.]”); id. at 187–88 (discussing competitive
bidding process).
111
Maybell Romero, Low-Ball Defense (work in progress; on file with author).
112
For example, in South Dakota only three counties have public defender’s
offices. The remaining counties rely exclusively on court-appointed lawyers. Sixth
Amend. Ctr., Justice Shortchanged Part II, supra note 19, at 35–36. Although
more populated counties are more likely to have public defender’s offices, the
rural-urban divide on this issue is not complete. Studying Texas, Davies and Clark
found that “the likelihood [counties] had institutionalized their defense system was
no greater in urban than rural areas.” Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 263.
113
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-3401(1) (West 1996).
114
Id.; See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 3–4 (describing
the public defender system in each Nebraska county).
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any economy of scale” in criminal defense work because they cannot afford
a full-time public defender.115
The limited resources that prevent many counties from having a
public defender’s office also hamper access to justice in other ways.
Providing legal aid in rural areas is difficult. Rural areas have high poverty
rates and low per capita spending on legal aid.116 Legal aid attorneys and
offices simply are not available locally in most rural communities.117 Without
legal aid offices available, more private attorneys must provide legal aid-type
services, sometimes through court appointments.118 Attorneys in more
populated areas also take underpaid court appointments and pro bono cases,
but the issue here is the proportionality of that burden.119 Not only do rural
areas lack public defender and legal aid offices, but rural areas also lack
attorneys.
In their study of criminal appointments for indigent defendants,
Andrew Davies and Alyssa Clark found differences in the provision of
counsel in misdemeanor cases between urban and rural counties in Texas.120
Importantly, their research suggests that “appointment rates in misdemeanor
cases are far more a product of the simple unavailability of attorneys in rural

115

Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 280 (“As with the high per capita cost of
delivering other services to its sparse and small population, the high cost of
indigent defense in Greenlee County [Arizona] suggests the inability to achieve any
economy of scale by, for example, retaining a single lawyer to provide indigent
defense services on an ongoing basis in the way that Apache County [Arizona]
engages several under ongoing contracts.”).
116
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 116–17 (“Disproportionately high rural
poverty rates suggest that rural areas should receive greater amounts of available
legal aid funding, but data did not reveal that to be the case. In California, for
example, legal aid organizations that serve low-income rural residents receive less
than a third of the per-person funding that flows to organizations serving urban
populations, and the funding gap between rural and urban organizations has
widened in the last decade.”).
117
Access to Justice in Rural Areas, LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,
https://www.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-resources/resources-topic-type/access-justicerural-areas (last visited June 22, 2020) (“Providing legal aid to low-income people
in rural areas can be particularly challenging because of distance, lack of access to
transportation, and lack of awareness of the kinds of services and help that legal aid
can provide.”).
118
Haksgaard, supra note 92, at 217.
119
Hunter, supra note 9, at 11 (“[T]he burden in shifted onto the general
practitioner in the rural county, far out of proportion to the similar burden upon the
attorney in the metropolitan area.”).
120
Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 267.
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areas than they are of policy, political, or economic factors.”121 The rural
lawyer shortage plays a major role in heightening the negative impacts of low
hourly rates. The few attorneys that do live and work in rural areas are
expected to take all of the court appointments, even when those appointments
lose money for the attorney because the hourly rate does not cover overhead
costs.122 At the same time, there is a supply and demand issue—in an urban
area, there will likely always be an attorney to take a case, but in a rural area,
even one or two attorneys refusing to take low-paid appointments can
“obstruct the entire system.”123
Having local attorneys take cases is good for everyone because then
counties do not have to pay for travel and attorneys and/or their clients are
not required to travel. However, currently it is not always possible to find
local attorneys able or willing to take court-appointment cases and counties
must look for outside lawyers willing to travel. In this way, when rates are so
low that many lawyers will opt out of taking court-appointment cases, having
fewer local lawyers means appointed counsel is more likely to be from a
different community. Thus, the access to justice barriers begin to compound
because lawyers are not geographically accessible to their clients.

B. Accessibility of Lawyers
When there are too few local lawyers able or willing to take cases,
the appointed lawyers may be located in different counties—or even different
states—decreasing accessibility. This in turn leads to an added burden of
travel and distance that falls disproportionately on those in rural areas. Rural
travel takes time and resources, and the reality of rural distance—namely,
poor roads, inclement weather, driving in the dark, and unreliable cellular
reception—impacts attorney willingness to take cases and ability to provide
representation. The combination of low hourly rates that prevent some
lawyers from taking cases and the rural lawyer shortage means more clients

121

Id.
See, e.g., Hills, supra note 9, at 1004 (arguing the burden falls “upon the
few available members of the private criminal bar” in “rural counties with few
practitioners[.]”).
123
Zoom Interview with Kathy Pakes, supra note 7; See also Pruitt et al.,
supra note 11, at 106–08 (providing a vignette about Gregory County, South
Dakota, to demonstrate how even a couple of rural attorneys opting out of courtappointed cases can impact an entire county).
122
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in rural counties are without local counsel.124 Counties may have no option
but to hire attorneys who have to travel long distances for appointed cases.125
No national data exists on how many court-appointed lawyers are crossing
county or state lines to take cases, but the anecdotal evidence suggests it is a
substantial problem.126
In 2015, Kansas paid only $62 per hour for court-appointed work;
the dearth of local lawyers willing to take cases at that rate meant that
counties were considering appointing lawyers from out of state.127 In
Wisconsin, rural northern counties have long struggled to appoint local
attorneys.128 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court described the situation for
criminal appointments:
In Bayfield County, cases are now assigned to out-of-county
private attorneys 99 percent of the time. At a recent
legislative hearing, the [state public defender] testified that
its Appleton office had to make an average of 17 contacts
per case just to find an assigned counsel attorney. In three
difficult cases, it took 302, 261, and 260 contacts to find an
attorney. The Ashland office (Ashland, Bayfield, and Iron
counties) needed nearly 39 contacts per case and an average
of 24 days to find an attorney. In Marathon County, it takes
an average of 80 contacts and 17 days to appoint a private

124

Zoom Interview with Adam Plotkin, supra note 7 (explaining that even if
hourly rates are high enough that most attorneys are willing to take cases, if a rural
community does not have attorneys available, there will be no local appointments
and outside attorneys will be asked to travel far distances).
125
Hancock, supra note 84 (“‘And because of the lack of qualified attorneys
willing to accept appointed cases at the hourly rate that the board pays, we’re
having to call in attorneys at a distance,’ [Patricia] Scalia told reporters after the
hearing.”); Vielmetti, supra note 85 (discussing a lawyer who travels to 19 rural
counties because “fewer and fewer lawyers” will accept court appointments).
126
Even the first national attention paid to the issue of the rural lawyer
shortage included a discussion of a rural county having to pay for court-appointed
attorneys to travel. Ethan Bronner, No Lawyer for Miles, So One Rural State Offers
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/us/subsidyseen-as-a-way-to-fill-a-need-for-rural-lawyers.html (“All [of the lawyers gathered
in town for court day] had driven more than two hours from Rapid City and Pierre,
paid by Bennett County[.]”).
127
Hancock, supra note 84.
128
In re the Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 6.
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attorney to a case. In Price County, it takes an average 33
days to appoint a private attorney to a case.129
One natural solution to the difficulty of finding lawyers to appoint is to look
outside of the communities that need the lawyers. This was happening in
Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court gave the example of Ashland
County who, “in FY 2012 . . . appointed only 28 percent of cases to out-ofcounty private attorneys. In FY 2017, that number had risen to 73 percent.”130
Matthew Kirkpatrick, the Wisconsin attorney who keeps his expenses low so
he can afford to take court appointments, demonstrates an extreme case of
travel in northwestern Wisconsin. In 2017, Kirkpatrick “took on cases for the
State Public Defender in 19 rural counties, putting more than 46,000 miles
on his 2012 Dodge Durango, sometimes driving 350 miles round-trip for a
single case.”131
As Lisa R. Pruitt with various co-authors has argued repeatedly,
distance itself decreases access to justice.132 The problem exists regardless of
whether it is the lawyers or the clients who travel. Asking attorneys to do all
the traveling is not a tenable solution. While some states pay for travel time
and costs,133 not all do.134 Wisconsin, which pays for travel at the rate of $25
per hour, has not increased that hourly compensation rate since at least

129

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 6.
131
Vielmetti, supra note 85 (discussing lawyer Matthew Kirkpatrick).
132
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 121 (“Many counties with too few attorneys
are contiguous to others with the same deficit, so that engaging an attorney in a
neighboring county may also prove difficult, even for those who can afford to
travel.”); Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Justice in the Hinterlands: Arkansas As A Case Study
of the Rural Lawyer Shortage and Evidence-Based Solutions to Alleviate It, 37 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 573, 634–35 (2015) (“I know that many Arkansans
miss out on legal representation simply because there are no lawyers around and it
is often too expensive to travel for legal advice.”); Pruitt & Showman, supra note
106, at 485–87 (“Physical space itself is often a literal roadblock to gaining access
to all sorts of services… include[ing] those provided by lawyers[.]”).
133
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08(4m)(d) (“[A]ttorneys shall be paid…$25 per
hour for time spent in travel related to a case if any portion of the trip is outside the
county in which the attorney's principal office is located or if the trip requires
traveling a distance of more than 30 miles, one way, from the attorney's principal
office.”).
134
Hancock, supra note 84 (noting Kansas does not pay for transportation
costs or travel time).
130
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1992.135 The low rate for travel is a “disincentive” for attorneys to take cases
in Wisconsin.136 Attorney travel costs time and money. It also decreases the
efficacy of representation. In rural Arizona,
[a]ttending the required hearings allows an opportunity for
attorneys to meet with clients in each locale, but it also
requires significant travel time. This pulls the attorney away
from other important matters, such as case investigation,
legal research, and motion preparation. As a result, attorneys
must choose between opportunities for meaningful client
communication on the one hand, and other important forms
of advocacy on the other.137
In an effort to decrease his travel commitments and time on the road,
Kirkpatrick has since reduced his regular travel from nineteen counties to ten
counties in rural Wisconsin.138 His personal decision to decrease his travel is
eminently reasonable. The issue is not that any individual attorney wants to
limit their travel; the issue is that low hourly rates have created a system
where there are not enough willing local attorneys in rural counties to take
the cases.
Things are no better when clients are asked to travel to their
appointed lawyers. When lawyers are not local to clients, it makes the
provision of legal services more difficult. This is especially true for clients
who are already disadvantaged: “[t]o overlook or deny the economic and
often gendered aspects of [travel] is to perpetuate a crisis.”139 Clients with
135

Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08(4m)(a) (providing travel
reimbursement of twenty-five dollars an hour for cases assigned before December
1, 1992), with WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08(4m)(d) (providing travel reimbursement
of twenty-five dollars an hour for cases assigned on or after January 1, 2020).
136
Zoom Interview with Kathy Pakes, supra note 7 (“[N]o attorneys [in some
rural areas], [and] we really can’t pay for them to travel and that is a disincentive to
take cases.”).
137
Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 291.
138
Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101.
139
Michele Statz & Jon Bredeson, Concerned about rural access to justice?
Start here first, NORTHLAND ACCESS TO JUST.,
https://www.northlandproject.org/the-rural-a2j-guide (last visited June 22, 2020).
For a relevant and related analysis of how women interact with barriers of distance
and travel in the context of health care see Michele Statz & Kaylie Evers, Spatial
Barriers as Moral Failings: What Rural Distance Can Teach Us About Women’s
Health and Medical Mistrust, 64 HEALTH & PLACE 102396 (2020).
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court-appointed lawyers are, by definition, indigent. Indigency combined
with other barriers will have a large impact on a client’s ability to travel to
meet an attorney in a rural area: “[a]n individual’s ability to traverse rural
distance largely depends on available childcare; a reliable vehicle; a driver’s
license; a consistent work schedule; the ability to secure time off; dis/ability;
age; health; weather; and road infrastructure. Each of these diverse needs
deserves attention.”140 Many of these same burdens exist in urban areas, but
the burdens are compounded in rural areas by distance and lack of public
transportation. In rural areas, these barriers can make it impossible for
indigent clients to travel to meet an appointed lawyer, which in turn can harm
the level of representation the client receives.141

C. Effectiveness of Lawyers
The fee structure, the insufficient number of willing attorneys, and
even inaccessibility of appointed attorneys means that the current courtappointment system risks appointing ineffective lawyers or encouraging
otherwise effective counsel to not act in the best interests of their clients.142
The system-wide concern about overall quality of lawyers is not an
indictment of individual lawyers, but instead that the system has created
incentives that are concerning. Various publications, including policy
reports, have expressed a fear of encouraging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
A report for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
asserts that “inadequate compensation” because of low hourly rates for courtappointed attorneys “diminishes the overall quality of representation.”143 A
report by the Public Policy Center at the University of Nebraska noted the
legal profession’s concern that too-low hourly rates for criminal
140

Statz & Bredeson, supra note 139.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7 (discussing
the importance of meeting face-to-face with clients to provide the best possible
representation).
142
See generally Hills, supra note 9, at 1012 (“Numerous commentators have
expressed serious concerns whether appointed attorneys providing free or
undercompensated services will be able to provide the same attention normally
provided a paying client, either through lack of availability of clerical or
investigative services which must be paid for, or through reduced motivation of the
attorney who knows that each hour he contributes to the case is failing to accrue
anything toward his overhead costs.”).
143
Benjamin, supra note 78, at 6; See also Gross, supra note 18, at 16 (“The
result is an inadequate, inexperienced, over-worked and inherently conflicted pool
of attorneys accepting court appointments in our criminal courts.”).
141
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appointments “would likely encourage attorneys to spend less time on court
appointed cases, and discourage more experienced attorneys from accepting
court appointments in the first place, thereby reducing the overall quality of
indigent defense provided in the state.”144 The Iowa State Bar Association
shares its concern that “[a] system that pays those who represent the poor less
than one third the usual and customary rate charged those who are not
indigent runs the risk of providing a lower quality of justice for the poor.”145
Simple economics suggest that lawyers who are paid a low hourly
rate with the additional restriction of either a maximum dollar amount or a
maximum number of billable hours will invest less time into that case.146 This
in turn threatens the right to counsel by decreasing the quality of legal
work.147 Appointed counsel may spend fewer hours than necessary on a given
case or may take too many cases in order to survive financially.148 The
problem is even worse when fixed-rate contracts are used. If an attorney has
contracted to cover a certain class of cases for a set amount of money, the
attorney “may become more lax in fulfilling their duties, doing as little as
possible while getting paid as much as possible under the contract.”149 This
is a problem: under fixed-rate contracts “it is in the lawyer’s own financial
interest to spend as little time as possible to quickly earn the fixed fee, placing
the lawyer in direct conflict with the indigent defendant’s interest in
achieving the best possible legal outcome.”150

144

Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 1.
Iowa State Bar Ass’n, supra note 56, at 2.
146
Walsh, supra note 77 (“Concepts of free market economics tell us that a
person paid a higher rate will generally provide a higher level of service and give
more attention to a case[.] A person sophisticated in free markets who looked at
this situation would probably conclude that any lawyer trying to make a living will
prefer to spend more time on a case paying $100 per hour than on one paying $40
per hour.”); See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 21 (“[Attorneys
in Nebraska] expressed concerns that because of the low rates, attorneys would not
spend adequate time on the case thereby affecting the quality of work the defense
receives.”).
147
Benjamin, supra note 78, at 6 (“Low hourly wages combined with caps on
fees undermine the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”).
148
Gross, supra note 18, at 8 (“In some cases, inadequate compensation may
induce attorneys to accept more clients than they can effectively represent in order
to maintain their practices.”).
149
Romero, supra note 6, at 199 (discussing prosecutors).
150
Carroll & Mann, supra note 34 (discussing criminal defense work). See also
Cullen, supra note 3, at 321–22 (noting concerns with the contract model for
criminal defense work).
145
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In counties where there are enough lawyers to fill the basic legal
needs of a community, paying below-market hourly rates may entice
sufficient numbers of lawyers to take court-appointed cases, but those
lawyers will not necessarily have sufficient skill or experience.151 Many
lawyers who take court appointments are young attorneys willing to lose
money in order to gain courtroom experience.152 As Hunter explained in
1969, “experience” is the young lawyer’s “compensation.”153 Once those
new lawyers gain experience through court-appointed work, they will likely
move onto other—higher paid—legal work.154 Even though judges express a
preference in appointing experienced lawyers in “more complex or serious
cases,” that might not be possible because there simply are not enough
experienced lawyers willing to take court appointments at the low hourly
rates.155 In an interview on this topic, one judge in Nebraska stated that court151

See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 21 (quoting a
Nebraska attorney) (“Low rates… ‘do not encourage good practitioners to remain
active on appointment lists.’”); See also Anderson & Heaton, supra note 42, at 194
(“Interviewees, including appointed counsel, note that while some of the lawyers
who are willing to take [criminal] appointments [in Philadelphia] are good, some
are not.”).
152
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 24 (“[M]any new attorneys
accept court appointments as a way to build experience.”); Walsh, supra note 77
(“However, as long as there are new lawyers willing to take these cases for the
purpose of cutting their teeth in court, there will be a market for cut-rate contracts.
This is an unfortunate circumstance but may be a lesson that the free market is not
necessarily the best way to provide a fundamental constitutional right to indigent
people.”); See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 24 (quoting a
Nebraska attorney) (“New attorneys take [court appointments] because it gets them
into court and it is a place to learn.”).
153
Hunter, supra note 9, at 11 (“As a result, in routine criminal cases the great
majority of the court appointments are imposed upon attorneys under 45. Within
limits, this appointment is welcomed by the young attorney to afford him
experience. However, experience is his only compensation.”).
154
Walsh, supra note 77 (“Private practice lawyers are thus doing this work
only if they can drastically reduce their overhead number or if they have some
other motive for doing the work such as ‘cutting their teeth’ in the courtroom
before moving on to higher paying work.”); See also Neb. Minority Just. Comm.,
supra note 20, at 24 (quoting a Nebraska attorney) (“After five years I am
considering myself ‘qualified’, however, my practice is large enough now that I am
considering dropping court appointments in state court because of the low rates.”).
155
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 11–12; See also In re the
Petition to Amend SCR 81.02, No. 17-06, supra note 38, at 8 (quoting Wisconsin
State Bar President Paul G. Swanson) (“The rate discourages experienced
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appointed attorneys “age out” of the attorney list maintained by their county
and “senior attorneys are not appointed if other attorneys are available.”156
This is not the official policy in Nebraska, but it appears to be a common
practice across jurisdictions.157 In both urban and rural areas, removing
senior, experienced attorneys from the list—either by choice of the court or
because the senior lawyers simply will not participate for the low rates—
“may have repercussions on the overall quality of counsel.”158
The young attorneys who are willing to take the cases for experience
may slow down the court process as they learn about new areas of law.159
Attorneys may also “take on more than they can handle, leading to more
delays, appeals, inefficiencies, and strains on the entire court system.”160
Judges in Nebraska report some dissatisfaction with the court-appointment
system because “less experienced lawyers” are sometime appointed “in more
serious or complex cases.”161 This raises the concern that indigent clients are
facing an additional access to justice challenge—even if counsel is
appointed, counsel may not provide the best representation.162 Similar
concerns arise for both prosecutors and defense attorneys hired after a
competitive bidding process because the focus is on hiring the lowest bidder,
not the best-qualified bidder.163
These problems exist in both urban and rural areas. But, once again,
rural areas face additional hurdles in finding qualified counsel. Even if a
county seeks to appoint only experienced counsel, the low number of
available attorneys may prevent counties from requiring specific

practitioners and the general effect of this is a diminishment of the rights of
individuals underrepresented or facing delays in representation, which only serves
to prejudice those rights.”).
156
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 13.
157
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 9, at 11 (“There is yet another way in which
the burden of accepting court appointments is very unfairly distributed. The
practice actually works out so that older, more experienced attorneys are rarely
called upon to accept court appointment[.]”).
158
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 13.
159
Vielmetti, supra note 85.
160
Id.
161
Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 13.
162
See, e.g., Bischoff, supra note 78 (“[Appointed counsel] simply cannot
provide a constitutionally sound defense at $40 an hour.”).
163
Romero, supra note 6, at 188 (prosecutors); Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3,
at 301–02 (defense attorneys).
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experience.164 The more likely problem in rural areas, however, is that when
the more experienced lawyers opt-out of taking court appointments because
of low pay,165 there simply are no inexperienced lawyers to take cases. The
bar is greying in rural areas—attorneys are aging out of practice and younger
attorneys are simply not replacing those aging attorneys.166 When those
experienced attorneys decline court-appointed cases, at best there are
inexperienced local attorneys to take court appointments. At worst, there are
no attorneys to take court appointments.
None of this is to criticize the individual lawyers who dedicate their
time and energy to taking court-appointed cases and providing access to
justice to indigent clients. Rather, the preceding is focused on the failures of
the system created by legislative and judicial bodies that chronically
underpay lawyers: lawyers who generally do their best to provide meaningful
counsel to indigent clients in the civil and criminal systems. Yet this situation
is not hopeless. Although low hourly rates have led to a near-crisis in some
rural areas, “there is nothing inevitable about rurality that need prevent access
to counsel from being achieved.”167 Accordingly, jurisdictions and localities
must begin to confront this issue to increase access to justice.

III.

SOLVING THE PROBLEM

Simply increasing the hourly rate paid to court-appointed attorneys
will not solve the access to justice problems associated with courtappointment cases. Not only are attorneys paid at too low of a rate, the
maximum number of paid hours per case is capped, and there are simply too
few attorneys willing to take the cases. Increasing the hourly rate will likely

164

See Romero, supra note 6, at 193 (discussing how suburban governments
might be able to advertise for lawyers with five or more years of experience but
advertising in that way might “narrow the field prohibitively . . . in an area with
only two or three active attorneys.”).
165
See, e.g., Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 24 (quoting a
Nebraska lawyer) (“There are a limited number of attorneys in the area and most
established ones will not work for the rates paid.”).
166
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 121 (“Our state surveys indicate that the
primary reason for dwindling attorney numbers in rural areas is that lawyers there
are aging and retiring, and too few new lawyers are stepping forward to take their
place.”).
167
Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 272 (articulating this view based on
research of criminal appointments in Texas).
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entice more attorneys to take court-appointed cases.168 However, if there are
not enough lawyers in a certain geographic area—or if those lawyers are
inexperienced—an increase in hourly rates cannot serve as a silver bullet169
guaranteeing access to justice. Simply increasing rates to attract urban or
suburban attorneys to travel to rural areas for court appointments is not a
viable solution.170 Relying on traveling attorneys not only increases the travel
expenses born by government entities, it means that counsel will not be
located near the clients being represented.
While an increase in hourly rates would benefit all communities—
regardless of population size and density—special considerations must be
made in designing solutions to work in rural areas.171 A recent attempt by
Nevada to improve indigent criminal defense work across the state serves as
an example. In 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court established an Indigent
Defense Commission to investigate concerns about indigent criminal defense
work across Nevada.172 After a number of years and a number of initiatives,
the state saw an improvement in indigent criminal defense in “the state’s
urban centers.”173 But those same initiatives failed to fix the criminal defense
problems in rural areas.
[F]ixing the “crisis” in rural Nevada has proven to be more
difficult. There are a wide variety of reasons for this,
including a lack of attorneys to do the work, the geographic
168

See, e.g., Vielmetti, supra note 85 (noting that rural lawyer Matthew
Kirkpatrick “supports the higher rate — not to make more profit, he wrote to the
court, but to get more lawyers to share the load and let him spend more time with
client concerns, and less time on the road.”).
169
Michele Statz and Jon Bredeson use the language of “silver bullet” in
challenging the assumption made by many that technology alone with solve the
rural access to justice crises. That language is just as applicable to any solution that
is viewed as a quick fix for the crises. Statz & Bredeson, supra note 140.
170
E-mail from Heather Scheiwe Kulp to author (Dec. 6, 2019, 9:26 AM) (on
file with author) (“Hard to find attorneys willing to take those cases, especially if
they have to travel to rural areas to do so (and may or may not be reimbursed
mileage).”).
171
Statz & Bredeson, supra note 140 (“Initiatives that work in an urban setting
likely won’t work in a rural one. But if your initiative is successful in a rural area, it
could be successful everywhere.”).
172
Sixth Amend. Ctr., Reclaiming Justice: Understanding the History of the
Right to Counsel in Nevada so as to Ensure Equal Access to Justice in the Future,
NEV. SUP. CT. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N iii (Mar. 2013),
https://sixthamendment.org/6ac/nvreport_reclaimingjustice_032013.pdf.
173
Id.
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expanse of most rural counties, and limited infrastructure to
train and evaluate attorneys.174
Nevada’s problem and its various solutions were specific to criminal defense
work and included initiatives to better support public defender’s offices and
court-appointed lawyers.175 But the lesson remains the same when applied to
criminal and civil court-appointed lawyers: solutions that work in urban areas
may not work in rural areas. Or more precisely, a single policy change, such
as increasing hourly rates and removing compensation caps, must be
combined with other changes in rural areas in order to be effective.
A critical part of making court-appointed lawyers more widely
available in rural areas is to simply have lawyers widely available in rural
areas. Increasing hourly rates should be a part of state initiatives to attract
rural lawyers. But, of course, having an adequate number of rural lawyers in
place will be critical to ensure local representation of indigent clients, even
once rates are increased.176 Adam Plotkin, Legislative Liaison at the
Wisconsin State Public Defender, explains that the rate increase in Wisconsin
is good and has been helpful in getting attorneys to take court appointments,
but until Wisconsin has “more people who are physically located closer to
rural areas, we are going to have some problems” in appointing attorneys.177
Increasing hourly rates and increasing the number of rural attorneys must
happen together and will feed off each other.
In addition to having more lawyers to provide court-appointment
services, there are other ways to support indigent clients, perhaps in ways
that avoid the need for appointed counsel. A single dedicated and salaried
legal aid attorney in a small or rural community can make a substantial
difference in access to justice.178 Additional services for parents may avoid
termination of parental rights petitions;179 additional community-based
174

Id.
Id.
176
Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 268 (“Among rural [Texas] counties,
access to counsel improves where counties have the trappings of urbanization:
small towns and more attorneys living locally.”).
177
Zoom Interview with Adam Plotkin, supra note 7.
178
See Nino C. Monea, The Administrative Power: How State Courts Can
Expand Access to Justice, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 254 (2017) (noting the benefits of
having more full-time legal aid attorneys).
179
Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Parents, Judging Place:
Poverty, Rurality, and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L. REV. 95, 133–46
175
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mental health services may avoid involuntary commitment proceedings;
additional community services may decrease crime. Investing in rural
communities cannot start or stop with increasing hourly rates for courtappointed attorneys. Yet, ensuring that the court-appointment system works
is a very important piece because the use of some appointed attorneys is
inevitable.
Just as having a dedicated and salaried legal aid attorney could
provide critical services to a community, having a dedicated and salaried
public defender might do the same. A constant thread in figuring out how
best to provide counsel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright,180 is whether
governments should use public defenders instead of appointed or contract
counsel. The fact that low hourly rates increase the risk that court-appointed
lawyers may provide ineffective assistance of counsel181 does not necessarily
mean appointed counsel should be abandoned for public defender’s offices.
Although some evidence exists that public defender’s offices provide better
representation,182 the evidence is not conclusive that criminal defendants face
worse outcomes when represented by appointed counsel.183 But even if
conclusive evidence could show that public defenders were more successful
in representing clients, entirely abandoning appointed counsel for criminal
work is untenable. First, public defender’s offices will inevitably have
conflicts requiring appointed counsel to take some cases. Second, a public
defender’s office does not scale to the smallest counties that cannot support
even one full-time public defender.184 Third, it ignores that the beneficial
(2012) (providing recommendations for how rural areas can aid parents facing
termination of the parental rights).
180
372 U.S. at 335.
181
See infra Part II.C. Effectiveness of Counsel.
182
See, e.g., Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 268 (finding that for criminal
appointments in Texas “counties have taken the step of forming an agency
dedicated to providing defense representation, access to counsel was better.”);
Anderson & Heaton, supra note 42, at 159 (finding that for murder appointments in
Philadelphia there is a “striking” difference in outcomes between defendants
represented by appointed counsel compared to public defender’s offices).
183
See Feeney & Jackson, supra note 3 (finding, after collecting and analyzing
many pre-1991 studies on the different types of criminal defense systems, that
outcomes were very similar for criminal defendants).
184
See, e.g., Feeney & Jackson, supra note 3, at 369–70 (“Some of the
arguments advanced in favor of assigned counsel are that such a system . . . is
decentralized in nature and therefore more efficient in rural areas[.]”); Pruitt &
Colgan, supra note 3, at 312 (“Nonmetropolitan counties across the nation face
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specialization possible in large public defender’s offices would be impossible
in rural communities.185 Fourth, it ignores that a public defender operating
alone in a rural county will not have the benefit of an office filled with other
criminal defense attorneys.186 Finally, any solution that proposes small
counties pool resources to create a shared full-time public defender’s office
faces concerns of travel and inaccessibility.187 This is not to say appointed
particular challenges to funding and delivering justice—challenges that stem from
characteristics such as sparse populations and the related inability to achieve
economies of scale in service delivery.”).
185
For example, in Maricopa County—the county that includes Phoenix,
Arizona, and has a population of over four million—the public defender’s office
includes juvenile specialists. Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3, at 293 n.466. Pruitt &
Colgan argue that “counties that have the resources to fund programs that allow
defense attorneys to develop specialization in juvenile defense (including the trial
of juveniles in adult court) have a significant advantage over counties that utilize
generalists in these cases.” Id. In another example, in 2020 and faced with the
threat state-wide budget cuts because of COVID-19, the Georgia Public Defender’s
Office decided to terminate its appellate division. Bill Rankin, Georgia defender
system dismantles appellate office spared from budget cut, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS (June 26, 2020),
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/breakingnews/story/2020/jun/26/georgiadefender-system-dismantles-appellate-office-spared-budget-cut/526313/.
Removing these dedicated appellate defenders means a loss of specialized appellate
attorneys in the office. There is concern that replacing specialized appellate public
defenders with appointed counsel will lead to worse outcomes for criminal
defendants. See Andrew Fleischman (@ASFleischman), TWITTER (June 18, 2020,
12:55 PM), https://twitter.com/ASFleischman/status/1273675702420803585 (“The
huge downside of their loss, of course, is that the State is going to rely on contract
attorneys to handle appeals instead. These lawyers are, on average, slower and less
experienced. And while they are arguably cheaper, you get what you pay
for.”);Andrew Fleischman (@ASFleischman), TWITTER (June 18, 2020, 12:59
PM), https://twitter.com/ASFleischman/status/1273676743598125061 (“Georgia's
appellate courts are going to notice a significant downturn in the quality of the
briefing they receive.”).
186
One reason that public defenders are seen as better than appointed counsel
is precisely because public defenders are able to work together and share the
burden of criminal representation. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 42, at 197–
98 (discussing how court-appointed criminal defense attorneys in Philadelphia tend
to be solo practitioners and do not have the same support as public defenders);
Davis & Clark, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that one benefit of a dedicated public
defender’s office over appointed private counsel is the “benefit from the esprit de
corps of being a member of a public defense institution.”).
187
See supra Part II.B. Accessibility of Lawyers (discussing particular issues
with travel).
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counsel is better than public defenders, but just to reinforce the point that
appointed counsel cannot be entirely replaced.188 Even if jurisdictions begin
creating more public defender’s offices and hiring more public defenders,
there would still be court-appointed attorneys and those attorneys would still
require higher hourly rates.
In addition to everything else, policymakers must keep in mind that
many lawyers taking court appointments are balancing student loan
payments on top of the costs of running a law practice. Increasingly,
educational costs and the corresponding debt loads after graduation impact
the types of jobs new law school graduates want189 and can drive new
graduates away from rural jobs.
Debt has had a terrifically negative impact on small town
attorneys and is a main contributing factor to the decline of
young lawyers locating in rural Iowa. It is extremely difficult
to recruit young attorneys to a small town. It has been
common for many who have started practices in smaller
communities to leave their community simply because they
cannot pay their student loans.190
188

See Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 269 (discussing criminal appointments
in Texas by noting that although institutionalized criminal defense systems provide
better access to counsel “[w]e do not automatically conclude all assigned counsel
systems must be failures, however. Rather, we recommend to those who choose to
deliver defense services in this way that they work to establish mechanisms to
assure the quality of services provided through adequate funding, oversight, and
other efforts to create a culture of excellence in delivery of representation.”).
189
Monea, supra note 178, at 219–20 (discussing increasing debt loads for law
school graduates and interest in high-paying jobs). Jonathan D. Glater, Law School,
Debt, and Discrimination, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548, 548 (2019) (“While empirical
evidence of the impact of indebtedness on decision-making is scarce, the data we
do have suggests that more borrowing for law school correlates with a lower
likelihood of seeking a career devoted to the public interest.”); Id. at 549 (“The
more students must pay for law school, the more likely it is that they will seek
more lucrative careers.”).
190
Iowa State Bar Ass’n, supra note 56, at 2; See also Backus & Marcus,
supra note 44, at 1061 (“In Iowa, the former president of the Iowa State Bar
Association decried the use of caps in paying for indigent defense. He asserted that
the system actively discouraged competent attorneys from taking appointments.
Recent law school graduates can no longer seek viable employment in the area
because the debt loads from law school are too much and the compensation for
indigent defense appointments is too little. ‘There is no chance,’ he wrote, ‘of
servicing a $75,000 debt, let alone paying for a car, house and family, on the fees
from indigent defense.’”).
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The negative impact of student loan payments may be particularly harsh in
rural areas because of the high burden of court-appointed work done by
young, rural lawyers.191 If a private practice attorney earns, say, $60 an hour
for appointed work, that attorney must use the money to cover business
expenses, including employment benefits. On the other hand, a full-time
government attorney receives a salary on top of the government covering
overhead costs and providing additional compensation through a benefits
package.192 For some attorneys, it is only possible to take court appointments
if a spouse has good benefits at work.193
But the difference in direct benefits like health insurance or
retirement accounts is not the only reason hourly wages are not comparable.
Full-time public interest or government lawyers, including public defenders
and prosecutors, qualify for federal student loan forgiveness under the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness Program.194 However, a private practice
attorney—even one who does a lot of court-appointed work that serves the
public good—does not qualify for this federal student loan forgiveness
program.195 I have written previously about the need to consider all rural
lawyers as public interest lawyers for the purpose of existing loan forgiveness

191

Iowa State Bar Ass’n, supra note 56, at 2 (“Many of the lawyers
performing indigent defense are younger attorneys who are carrying significant
student debt.”).
192
See, e.g., Carroll & Mann, supra note 34 (noting that employees of the state
public defender’s office in Wisconsin are “employees . . . and paid by the state,
with all of their overhead needs provided by the state.”).
193
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101
(noting that his wife has benefits through her employment and those benefits make
it possible to dedicate so much of his time to court appointments and pro bono
work).
194
Haksgaard, supra note 92, at 219 (“[T]he Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Program (“PSLF”) . . . provides loan forgiveness to qualifying borrowers who work
full-time in public service for ten years while making income-based repayments.”).
195
Id. (“PSLF does not allow any attorney in private practice to participate,
thus excluding a large number of rural lawyers whose work should be considered
public interest lawyering.”). All attorneys are qualified for income-based
repayment plans that forgive debt after twenty years of payment. For a discussion
of income-based repayment schemes in comparison to PSLF, see John R. Brooks,
Curing the Cost Disease: Legal Education, Legal Services, and the Role of IncomeContingent Loans, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 521 (2019).
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programs,196 and I have joined others in proposing loan forgiveness programs
aimed directly at rural lawyers.197 The need for loan forgiveness programs
may be particularly salient for rural lawyers engaged in a substantial amount
of court-appointed work.
I continue to believe that all rural attorneys should qualify for federal
loan forgiveness programs, but I also recognize that narrower programs could
target court-appointment work. For example, a loan forgiveness program
could forgive student loans if a lawyer took a certain number of courtappointed cases a year.198 The program could even be limited to high-need
areas, including rural counties.199 A loan forgiveness program would need to
be partnered with sufficient hourly rates and would be good in two ways.
First, the program would encourage lawyers to take court-appointed cases
and represent indigent clients in important civil and criminal matters. Second,
the program would incentivize lawyers to set up their practices in high-need
areas, including rural communities.
Just like the cost of student loans can be mitigated through targeted
programs, so can other expensive or time-consuming tasks, such as legal
research. In a 2019 article, Thomas Sneed advocated for law school libraries
to provide support to rural attorneys, who frequently have fewer resources
available.200 Mitigating the cost of legal research—whether in time or
money—would help cut the overhead costs for rural attorneys taking courtappointed cases. The Legal Practice Incubator program at the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law attempts to
decrease overhead costs in a similar way—it “reimburses participants for
$3,000 in business expenses, and offers free legal research software, bar

196

Haksgaard, supra note 92, at 219 (“Because rural private practice attorneys
face the same salary pressures as traditional public interest lawyers and because
covering rural private practice attorneys meets the stated goals of the program,
PSLF should be amended to cover rural private practice.”).
197
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 144 (proposing rural practitioners receive loan
forgiveness).
198
The Wisconsin legislature debated such a plan in 2017, but the bill failed.
The Wisconsin bill proposed student loan forgiveness for attorneys who took a
certain number of criminal defense appointments in rural areas. 2017 ASSEMBLY
BILL 567, S.J. Res. 1, (Wis. 2017), available at
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/proposals/ab567 .
199
See, e.g., id.
200
Thomas Sneed, The Academic Law Library's Role in Cultivating the Rural
Lawyer, 64 S.D. L. REV. 213, 230–31 (2019).
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memberships and continuing legal education credits.”201 States and local
governments that appoint counsel can aid attorneys in comparable ways by
providing funding for paralegal assistance, appointing a second attorney in
complicated cases, and paying other expenses.202
These solutions focus on recruiting the new attorney to rural areas,
but attention should also be paid to established lawyers nearing retirement
who might hire an associate but are financially unable to do so. Phil Garland
explains that in rural Iowa “a lot of attorneys have said they would hire an
associate if there was better pay for court-appointed work.”203 Higher hourly
rates would encourage more new lawyers to work in rural areas and make it
easier for an established attorney to hire an associate because guaranteed
income from court-appointed cases is “almost like a stipend for the
associate.”204 Remember, Garland loses $35 an hour when his associate
attorney takes court-appointed juvenile cases, but Garland has been a longtime participant in court-appointed work and is now dedicated to facilitating
his associate doing this work.205 Not all established attorneys would make
this sacrifice, but increasing hourly rates could encourage established
lawyers to hire associates, which in turn aids law firm transitions as aging
attorneys retire.
As policymakers at different levels of government—including state
legislators, county and city elected officials, state-wide court administrators,
and even the local judges who appoint lawyers—make decisions about how
to ensure sufficient, accessible, and effective court-appointed lawyers, the
attention must be on broad changes. Any change—such as increasing rates,
removing hourly caps, or paying student loans—will make a difference and
encourage more and better court-appointment work. However, “[a]s with
solving the access-to-justice crisis itself, no one strategy or program will
meet all the needs of [jurisdictions] aiming to support rural practice and rural
201

Wendy N. Davis, No Country for Rural Lawyers: Despite incentives, smalltown attorneys still find it hard to thrive, A.B.A. J., (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/no-country-for-rural-lawyers; See
also Rural Practice Incubator Project, WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCH. OF L.,
https://ualr.edu/law/clinical-programs/rural-practice-incubator-project/ (last visited
July 14, 2020).
202
See Zoom Interview with Kathy Pakes, supra note 7 (noting how in
Wisconsin if the State Public Defender appoints counsel, it controls reimbursement
for expenses which allows for costs such as paralegal assistance).
203
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
204
Id.
205
Id.
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justice systems” through increasing court-appointment rates.206 It is also true
that “simply injecting funding into rural programs is not enough to generate
an impact. To improve access to counsel, resources must be accompanied by
careful plans for implementation and a realistic approach to bringing needed
partners aboard.”207 The most successful way to approach this problem will
be to combine various strategies aimed at increasing hourly rates for courtappointed lawyers and employ those strategies with broader action to bring
more lawyers into rural areas.

CONCLUSION
Increasing hourly rates will come with costs: counties may struggle
to pay for the increased costs of court-appointed attorneys,208 defendants
required to pay back attorney’s fees will face higher financial burdens,209 and
counties may switch to a different fee structure—such as a low-bid
contract—to avoid paying the higher costs.210 The current system of low
206
Pruitt et al., supra note 11, at 153 (discussing how law schools will have to
take various approaches).
207
Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at 271; See also id. at 270 (“Reform was
most successful when it had the support of the local judiciary, who had to accept
the logistical demands of assuring presence of counsel; of county legislatures and
executives, who had to approve and oversee the program; and of prosecutors and
law enforcement, whose own roles and responsibilities would change with the
introduction of new services.”).
208
See generally Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 3 (discussing problems with local
funding of criminal defense work).
209
See, e.g., Timothy W. Bjorkman, A State in Shackles: The Effect of A
Dysfunctional Childhood on Crime and Imprisonment, 62 S.D. L. REV. 211, 247
(2017) (“South Dakota, like many other states, permits the county to take a lien
against the defendant's assets for the cost of any court-appointed attorney's fees.”).
For just one example of a state statute authorizing recoupment of attorney’s fees,
see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-106 (West 1996). States also allow for counties
to recoup the cost of prosecution from convicted defendants. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. § 815.13 (West 1985) (allowing recoupment of some prosecution fees from
criminal defendants). For just one example of the problems with recouping
attorney’s fees from indigent criminal defendants, see Mark Walker, In S.D., right
to an attorney comes with a price, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 4,
2016),https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2016/03/04/sd-right-attorneycomes-price/81205714/ (last updated Mar. 8, 2016).
210
See Neb. Minority Just. Comm., supra note 20, at 1 (noting concerns of the
legislative committee who commissioned the report). It seems unlikely that the
smallest counties will ever switch to a public defender model because of scale; See
also Feeney & Jackson, supra note 3, at 405 (“This study found that public
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hourly compensation rates, however, has created a system where lawyers are
insufficient in number, inaccessible geographically, and pushed towards
being ineffective. This is a particular problem in rural areas where access to
justice deficiencies are already widespread.211
State-specific and national studies show that low hourly rates are
harmful in all types of communities. This article adds to the conversation on
court-appointed attorneys a focus on rural areas and particular issues inherent
to those communities. It also adds to the conversation on solving the rural
lawyer shortage by proposing that increased hourly rates for court-appointed
attorneys is a critical aspect of recruiting new attorneys to rural areas. The
battle for increased hourly rates will likely never end. As the lowest paying
states in the nation increase their hourly rates, new states become the bottom
and must battle the same issues.212
Wisconsin is the most recent state to substantially increase hourly
rates—on January 1, 2020, the rate increased from $40 to $70 for criminal
appointments made by the public defender’s office. This change was
effective on January 1, 2020, but the increased hourly rates applied only to
appointments that started after January 1, 2020. Unsurprisingly, lawyers in
Wisconsin were turning down appointments in November and December
knowing that they would be working under the old, lower rate, even after the
new rate became effective in January.213 Since January of 2020, Wisconsin
attorney Matthew Kirkpatrick has noticed “a little less urgency” behind the
requests for counsel.214 Kathy Pakes, the Assigned Counsel Division Director
at the Wisconsin State Public Defender, has observed several changes in how
court appointments are operating: she has observed an increased number of
attorneys who are on the appointment list, the attorneys on the list are taking
defender costs were lower in the large jurisdictions (400,000 or more) but higher in
the smaller jurisdictions.”) (citing L. Silverstein, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT
(1965)).
211
See generally Pruitt, et al., supra note 11 (establishing there is a rural
lawyer shortage and discussing its implications); Davies & Clark, supra note 3, at
268 (studying criminal defense appointments and arguing that “rural areas impose
logistical barriers to providing defense services at all.”).
212
For a law and economics analysis of how the low payment for criminal
defense systems is endemic to the monopsony that exists in the court-appointed
system and therefore difficult to change, see Dru Stevenson, Monopsony Problems
with Court-Appointed Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2273, 2274 (2014).
213
Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101; See also
Zoom Interview with Kathy Pakes, supra note 7.
214
Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101.

128

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

[Vol. XIV

more cases, and the backlog of appointments is cleared in almost every
county.215 Pakes believes clearing the backlog of cases is “absolutely due to
the rate change,” but also recognizes that understanding the full impact of the
rate change is complicated because of COVID-19.216 The total number of
appointed criminal cases is down in Wisconsin, probably due to COVID-19,
and some attorneys may only be taking court-appointed cases to ensure some
guaranteed income while the economy is halted due to the pandemic.217 At
this point, there is no way to know how much of the change in Wisconsin has
been driven by the rate change and how much has been driven by systemic
issues created by COVID-19.218
Iowa increased its rate by a mere $3 an hour on July 1, 2019. Iowa
attorney Phil Garland observed this increase “hasn’t made a nickel’s worth
of difference” in attorneys taking cases.219 The original goal in Iowa was to
do a three-year increase in rates for a total increase of $10 an hour.220 Along
with other financial hits in Iowa, COVID-19 meant that the second increase
did not happen in the 2020 legislative session.221 It is unclear when Iowa will
provide additional increases.
What is clear is that increasing hourly rates to keep pace with the rate
of inflation and the increasing overhead costs of running law offices is critical
to having attorneys take court-appointed cases. Paying a fair rate to courtappointed attorneys is one step to increasing access to justice for indigent
Americans and dealing with the rural lawyer shortage. There is some
evidence that criminal defendants in rural areas have worse outcomes than
those in urban areas because of the difference in available resources.222 This
is concerning and shows that changes must be made. Not only do hourly rates
need to be increased, but the rural lawyer shortage must be addressed.
Ultimately, hourly rate increases will be necessary to attract sufficient
numbers of lawyers to take court appointments that are both accessible and
effective. But, in addition to fee increases, states need to take other steps,
such as loan repayment for rural court-appointed attorneys or removing
215

Zoom Interview with Kathy Pakes, supra note 7.
Id.
217
Zoom Interview with Adam Plotkin, supra note 7.
218
Telephone Interview with Matthew Kirkpatrick, supra note 101.
219
Telephone Interview with Phil Garland, supra note 7.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Braunstein & Schweinle, supra note 73, at 449 (explaining the disparate
outcomes between criminal defendants in urban and rural areas as based on
resource availability).
216
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hourly caps on court appointments. It is only with system-wide changes,
including an increase in hourly rates, that access to justice concerns in rural
America can be addressed.

